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Dependency analysis of critical infrastructures is a computationally intensive problem
when dealing with large-scale, cross-sectoral, cascading and common-cause failures. The
problem intensiﬁes when attempting a dynamic, time-based dependency analysis. This
paper extends a previous graph-based risk analysis methodology to dynamically assess the
evolution of cascading failures over time. Various growth models are employed to capture
slow, linear and rapidly evolving effects, but instead of using static projections, the
evolution of each dependency is “objectiﬁed” by a fuzzy system that also considers the
effects of nearby dependencies. To achieve this, the impact (and, eventually, risk) of each
dependency is quantiﬁed on the time axis into a form of many-valued logic. In addition,
the methodology is extended to analyze major failures triggered by concurrent common-
cause cascading events. A critical infrastructure dependency analysis tool, CIDA, that
implements the extended risk-based methodology is described. CIDA is designed to assist
decision makers in proactively analyzing dynamic and complex dependency risk paths in
two ways: (i) identifying potentially underestimated low risk dependencies and reclassify-
ing them to a higher risk category before they are realized; and (ii) simulating the
effectiveness of alternative mitigation controls with different reaction times. Thus, the
CIDA tool can be used to evaluate alternative defense strategies for complex, large-scale
and multi-sectoral dependency scenarios and to assess their resilience in a cost-effective
manner.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Most critical infrastructures (CIs) can be modeled as cyber-
physical systems whose cyber components control theirElsevier B.V. This is an o
nd/4.0/).
jrc.ec.europa.eu (M. Theunderlying physical components. Critical infrastructures are
inherently complex systems because they integrate hetero-
geneous platforms, proprietary systems and protocols, and
open communications networks. In addition, criticalpen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
ocharidou).
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dent with other critical infrastructures that belong to other
sectors (e.g., energy, information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) and transportation). According to Rinaldi et al.
[33], critical infrastructures may have physical, informational
and logical dependencies. Speciﬁcally, a failure in one infra-
structure may affect the operation of other critical infrastruc-
tures as a result of their dependencies. Note that a failure is
meant in a broad sense and covers an accidental failure,
natural disaster or deliberate cyber attack [22]. In the case of a
geographical dependency, seemingly independent critical
infrastructures may be affected by a threat due to their
physical proximity. Protecting against such types of failures
is an active area of research as manifested by the numerous
projects on the topic, including DIESIS [35,47], I2Sim [27] and
CIPRNet [8]. Dependency modeling, simulation and analysis
have been studied extensively by researchers. A recent
publication [30] surveys current approaches and classiﬁes
them into several broad categories, including empirical, agent
based, system dynamics based, economic theory based and
network based approaches, among others.
Disruptions or outages in critical infrastructures are
usually categorized as cascading, escalating or common-
cause failures [33]. A cascading failure occurs when an
infrastructure A affects one or more components in another
infrastructure B, which, in turn, leads to the partial or total
unavailability of infrastructure B. An escalating failure occurs
when a disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates an
independent disruption in another infrastructure, usually by
increasing the severity of the disruption and/or the time
needed to recover from the second failure. A common-
cause failure occurs when two or more infrastructures are
disrupted at the same time; components within each infra-
structure fail due to a common cause. This occurs when two
infrastructures are co-located (geographic interdependency)
or when the root cause of the failure is widespread (e.g., a
natural or human-initiated disaster).
1.1. Large-scale and cross-sectoral dependencies
The most common examples of large-scale failures caused by
critical infrastructure dependencies involve power transmis-
sion networks, such as the major blackouts of 2003 in the
United States, Canada and Europe [1]. The cascading process
of a failure has been studied and modeled by several
researchers [3,10,32,51,54,55]. Although there is a lack of
statistical data for such failures, recent efforts (see, e.g.,
[49]) have produced failure statistics based on empirical data
reported by the media. One of the key ﬁndings is that large-
scale critical infrastructure cascading dependencies occur
more frequently than expected. However, the effects do not
often cascade deeply; speciﬁcally, critical infrastructure
nodes that are four or ﬁve hops away in a dependency chain
are rarely affected. Another key ﬁnding is that, although most
reported initiators of cascading effects are critical infrastruc-
ture assets belonging to the energy and information and
communications technology sectors, the cascading effects
are primarily cross-sectoral in nature (i.e., critical infrastruc-
ture assets in multiple sectors are affected). This is reason-
able because the source infrastructures (energy andinformation and communications technology) usually pro-
vide vital services to other critical infrastructures in various
sectors, thus creating multiple direct (or ﬁrst-order)
dependencies.
1.2. Motivation
In recent years, several dependency analysis methodologies
and tools have been developed; these focus on the impact
[13], consequences [34] or risk derived from critical infra-
structure dependencies [18–21,48] and their potential cascad-
ing effects. The methodologies and tools are usually sector-
speciﬁc and oriented towards power distribution (e.g., [5]) or
water distribution networks (e.g., [17]). These tools are very
useful for low-level analyses of small-scale scenarios (e.g.,
identifying the critical components within a power transmis-
sion network). However, they may fall short when high-level
analyses are needed in order to model large-scale, cross-
sectoral scenarios. One example is the identiﬁcation of
dependency paths of high economic or societal risk that
affect multiple sectors.
Critical infrastructure asset owners and operators typically
perform risk assessments at the organization level and may
not have knowledge about (or interest in) threats that
emanate from dependent critical infrastructures. This knowl-
edge can be acquired, to some extent, by conducting inter-
national table-top exercises [26]. Nonetheless, although the
economic impact of a failure can be assessed by a critical
infrastructure owner or operator (organization-wise), the
overall impact (or risk) of a given critical infrastructure failure
on a dependent critical infrastructure is not a tangible value,
especially when multi-order dependencies are present.
The need for high-level, multi-sectoral risk assessments
has been recognized by several international bodies [12]. A
high-level risk analysis allows the identiﬁcation of complex
cascade or common-cause risk paths and the comparison of
alternative mitigation strategies. Note that a multi-layer risk
assessment is not an alternative to organization-wide risk
assessments because they are prerequisite inputs to a multi-
layer risk analysis. Such an analysis requires the modeling
and analysis of hundreds or even thousands of critical
infrastructures. The complexity is even greater if a time-
based analysis is to be performed. Unfortunately, the compu-
tation of the cumulative security risks and the identiﬁcation
of the critical points of failure are NP-complete and, thus,
suboptimal (albeit useful) dependency analysis tools have to
be developed.
1.3. Contributions
This paper extends recent work on critical infrastructure
dependency analysis [19–21]. The ﬁrst extension is the use
of time-based analysis models to study the evolution of
dependency chains during slow, linear and rapidly evolving
cascading failures. Note that each dependency may follow a
different time model that is “ﬁne-tuned” to each examined
dependency using fuzzy modeling. The second extension is
the modeling of concurrent cascading and common-cause
failures in order to effectively analyze major failures.
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ture dependency analysis tool that is based on risk analysis
and graph modeling. In particular, CIDA is a proactive
modeling and security dependency analysis tool for evaluat-
ing large-scale, cross-sectoral dependency scenarios. It allows
risk assessors and decision makers to analyze complex
dependency graphs and to identify critical dependency
chains before an actual threat has occurred. Thus, it can
reveal underestimated dependency risks that need further
attention. CIDA may also be used to efﬁciently assess alter-
native risk mitigation strategies and, thus, enhance critical
infrastructure resilience. In this work, resilience implies the
ability to withstand accidental or deliberate threats or inci-
dents [46].
In order to validate the applicability and efﬁciency of the
extended critical infrastructure dependency analysis
approach, the CIDA tool is stress-tested using random graphs
of up to one thousand critical infrastructure nodes with
randomly selected dependencies. The tests demonstrate the
computational efﬁciency of CIDA in large-scale scenarios
under reasonable parameters (maximum number of depen-
dencies per node and maximum order of dependencies). As a
proof of concept, targeted tests based on data from real
cascading and common-cause failures are also conducted.
Since a resilience-oriented approach acknowledges that fail-
ures will occur, critical infrastructures should implement
controls that effectively absorb, adapt to and rapidly recover
from disruptive events [14].2. Building blocks
This section brieﬂy describes the two main building blocks
used in the proposed methodology: (i) the underlying multi-
risk dependency analysis methodology for cascading failures;
and (ii) the fuzzy modeling approach used for the time-based
analysis of dependencies.2.1. Multi-risk dependency analysis methodology
The multi-risk dependency analysis method [19–21] that
forms the foundation of this work leverages the combined
results of organization-level risk assessments performed by
critical infrastructure owners and operators to assess the risk
of nth-order dependencies. Directed graphs are used toTable 1 – Mini telecommunications blackout – ﬁrst-order depe
Node: CI Secto
A: Laurentina-Inviolatella Telecommunications Node ICT
B: Fiumicino Airport Trans
C: ANSI Print Agency ICT
D: Post Ofﬁces Trans
E: Banks Finan
F: ACEA Power Distribution Energ
G: Fixed and Mobile Networks ICTvisualize the relationships (dependencies) between critical
infrastructures.
2.1.1. First-order dependency risk
A dependency can be deﬁned as a “one-directional reliance of
an asset, system, network or collection thereof – within or
across sectors – on an input, interaction or other requirement
from other sources in order to function properly” [9]. In this
work, dependencies are modeled using a graph G¼ ðN;EÞ
where N is a set of nodes (infrastructures or components)
and E is a set of edges (or dependencies). The graph is
directional in nature to model dependencies from one critical
infrastructure to other critical infrastructures. An edge from
node CIi to node CIj, i.e., CIi-CIj, denotes a risk relation that is
derived from the dependence of infrastructure CIj on a service
provided by infrastructure CIi. This relation is quantiﬁed
using the impact Ii;j and the likelihood Li;j of a disruption
being realized. The product of these two values is deﬁned as
the dependency risk Ri;j to infrastructure CIj due to its
dependence on infrastructure CIi. The numerical value asso-
ciated with each edge refers to the level of the cascade-
resulting risk for the receiver due to the dependency. This
risk is depicted using a risk scale [1..9] where 9 is the most
severe risk. All the parameters (Li;j; Ii;j, Ri;j) are deﬁned in order
to assess the risk of ﬁrst-order dependencies. The main input
to this method is provided by critical infrastructure owners
and operators, and refers to the obvious upstream depen-
dencies as mentioned above.
The method for modeling multiple ﬁrst-order dependen-
cies is clariﬁed using an example involving a mini-
telecommunications blackout in Rome in 2004 [23]. The cause
was a ﬂood at a major telecommunications service node
(Laurentina-Inviolatella) due to a broken pipe that provided
water to the cooling plant. This caused several circuits to fail,
including the main power supply. Backup power generators
failed to start due to the presence of water and the batteries
that provided power to electronic equipment were also
damaged. The cooling plant had to be shut down to perform
repairs, but this led to the overheating of several telecommu-
nication devices.
The disruption of Laurentina-Inviolatella (node A) caused
problems and delays in several infrastructures as shown in
Table 1 (based on the description in [23]). These included
Fiumicino Airport (node B), ANSI Print Agency (node C),
several post ofﬁces (node D), banks (node E), the ACEA power
distribution system (node F) and the communicationsndencies.
r First-Order Effects
–
portation Closure of check-in, ticketing,
baggage services and transfers
Data transmission problem
portation Delays and service perturbations
ce Delays and service perturbations
y Loss of SCADA monitoring and control
Partial connectivity and loss of
landline and mobile phone communications
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landline–mobile communications. In the example, the airport
(CIB) has a dependency risk RA;B from infrastructure CIA. This
risk value refers to the likelihood LA;B of the disruption of the
telecommunications node to cascade to the airport as well as
the societal impact IA;B on the airport when a failure has
occurred at infrastructure CIA, the source of the ﬁrst-order
dependency.2.1.2. Risk of nth-order dependencies
Using the ﬁrst-order dependencies as described in the exam-
ple above, it is possible to assess the potential nth-order
cascading risks using a recursive algorithm [20]. Let
CI¼ ðCI1;…CImÞ be the set of infrastructures. Let CIY0-CIY1-
…-CIYn denote a chain of connected infrastructures of length
n. Then, the recursive algorithm examines each critical
infrastructure as the potential root of a cascading effect
(denoted as CIY0 ) and computes the dependency risk DR
exhibited by CIYn due to its nth-order dependence.
If CIY0-CIY1-…-CIYn is a chain of dependencies, LY0 ;…;Yn
is the likelihood of the nth-order cascading effect and IYn 1 ;Yn
is the impact of the CIYn 1-CIYn dependency, then the
cascading risk exhibited by CIYn due to the nth-order depen-
dency is computed as:
RY0 ;…;Yn ¼ LY0 ;…;Yn  IYn 1 ;Yn  ∏
n1
i ¼ 0
LYi ;Yiþ1  IYn 1 ;Yn ð1Þ
The cumulative dependency risk considers the overall risk
exhibited by all the critical infrastructures in the sub-chains
of the nth-order dependency. Let CIY0-CIY1-…-CIYn be a
chain of dependencies of length n. The cumulative depen-
dency risk, denoted as DRY0 ;Y1 ;…;Yn , is deﬁned as the overall
risk produced by an nth-order dependency:
DRY0 ;…;Yn ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1
RY0 ;…;Yi 
Xn
i ¼ 1
∏
i
j ¼ 1
LYj 1 ;Yj
 !
 IYi 1 ;Yi ð2Þ
Eq. (2) computes the overall dependency risk as the sum of
the dependency risks of the affected nodes in the chain due
to a failure realized in the source node of the dependency
chain. The risk computation employs a risk matrix that
combines the likelihood and incoming impact values of each
vertex in the chain. Interested readers are referred to [19] for
additional details about dependency risk estimation.
In many instances, the likelihood values are difﬁcult to
estimate or may not be available. This means that, while a
dependency can be identiﬁed between two nodes, the prob-
ability of a failure to propagate between the two nodes is
either unknown or certain (likelihood¼1). In both cases, the
following simpliﬁed version of Eq. (2), which follows the
assumption that if a node fails, then the dependent nodes
will also fail (likelihood¼1), is used:
DRY0 ;…;Yn ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1
RY0 ;…;Yi 
Xn
i ¼ 1
IYi 1 ;Yi ð3Þ
The nth-order dependency risk is then calculated as the
cumulative impacts on the affected nodes in the
dependency chain.2.2. Fuzzy logic
The multi-risk methodology described above is static in time
because Eqs. (1) through (3) are based on the maximum
expected impact of each dependency. The values produced
by these equations assume that (i) each dependency chain
will always produce its worst case impact (and risk); and (ii)
all the dependencies exhibit the same impact growth rate.
However, in reality, neither all the critical infrastructure
nodes in a chain escalate to their maximum consequences
nor do they experience the same impact growth rate over
time. For this reason, the multi-risk methodology is extended
to incorporate a dynamic, time-based analysis and to assess
partial failure scenarios. Fuzzy set theory is used to model
this behavior.
Unlike classical set theory and classical logic, fuzzy set
theory and fuzzy logic attempt to ﬁnd approximations of
vague groupings in order to project objective evaluations of
values that are difﬁcult to compute [29]. A fuzzy variable has
a truth value in the range ½0; 1 for a possible outcome. The
goal is to approximate the time evolution of a cascading
failure using fuzzy approximations of impact evolution for
various growth models, similar to a real failure. For example,
an incident might initially have a slow cascading effect on
other dependent critical infrastructures and, as time goes by,
a failure to restore operations might lead to catastrophic
effects.3. Time-based analysis of cascading and
common-cause failures
First, the static dependency analysis methodology of [19–21]
is extended to incorporate a dynamic time-based analysis
model. Various cascading failure growth models are consid-
ered and fuzzy logic is applied to simulate realistic approx-
imations of dynamic cascading failures. In addition,
combined cascading and common-cause failures are consid-
ered when simulating the effects of dynamic, large-scale and
major disasters.
3.1. Modeling time-based analysis of cascading failures
As mentioned above, Ii;j and Li;j denote the impact (on a Likert
scale) and the likelihood (as a percentage) of a failure
experienced in dependency CIi-CIj, respectively. These
values are derived from assessments performed at the
organization level by critical infrastructure owners/operators.
As in most static risk assessment methodologies, the impact
value Ii;j refers to the maximum expected impact (in the
worst-case scenario) regardless of the time taken for the
maximum impact to be fully realized after a failure.
The following steps are used to perform dynamic time-
based analysis:
1. Model deﬁnition: Deﬁne various failure growth rates.
2. Setup: Using the growth rates, pre-compute all the possible
expected time-based impact values.
3. Calculate fuzzy time-based impact values: For a given depen-
dency risk graph, use the pre-computed expected time-
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obtain a fuzzy approximation of the time-based impact for
each dependency.
4. Assess time-related dependency risks: For each dependency
chain, output the time-based cumulative dependency risk
using the fuzzy time-based impact values.
These steps are described in the following subsections.
3.1.1. Model deﬁnition
Let Ti;j denote the time period that the dependency CIi-CIj
exhibits its maximum expected impact Ii;j and let Gi;j denote
the expected growth of the failure (e.g., slow, linear or rapid)
due to the dependency. The values of Ti;j and Gi;j, along with
Ii;j and Li;j, are obtained from critical infrastructure risk
assessments. Finally, let t denote an examined time period
after a failure.
In the remainder of this section, if there is no ambiguity,
the dependency indices are omitted for simplicity. Thus, I, T
and G are used instead of Ii;j, Ti;j and Gi;j, respectively.
All the values are assigned from the following Likert
scales:
 I A [1..9], where 1 is the lowest impact and 9 is the highest
impact.
 T; t A [1..10], which is a granular time scale that uses the
unavailability time periods: 1¼15 min, 2¼1 h, 3¼3 h,
4¼12 h, 5¼24 h, 6¼48 h, 7¼1 w, 8¼2 w, 9¼4 w and 10¼
more than 4 w.
 G A [1..3], where 1 represents slow, 2 linear and 3 rapid
growth (evolution) of a failure experienced due to the
examined dependency.
Deﬁnition 1. Let CIi-CIj be an examined dependency with
the maximum expected impact I experienced at time period T
after a failure and let G be the growth evolution of the failure.
The expected time-related impact of the dependency experi-
enced at time t is computed as:
I tð Þ ¼
Iðt=TÞ if G¼ 1 ðslow evolutionÞ
I  t
T
 
if G¼ 2 ðlinear evolutionÞ
I  logT t if G¼ 3 ðrapid evolutionÞ
8>><
>>:
ð4Þ
Obviously, IðtÞ ¼ I for tZT if no mitigation controls are taken
at the nodes.
Using Eq. (4), each dependency chain can be modeled with
the most appropriate growth evolution and a different model
can be used for each value of G. Rapid cascading effects are
considered to escalate logarithmically (i.e., rapid short-term
growth that stabilizes the maximum expected impact). Linear
cascading effects are considered to escalate following a
typical linear equation. Slow cascading effects follow an
exponential growth rate that starts at low initial values and
escalates towards the end of the time scale. Fig. 1 compares
various growth rates for the same I and T values.
To clarify the main concepts, consider a dependency risk
graph where the critical infrastructure dependenciesassociated with a nuclear power facility are modeled as
having very high impact (I¼9) experienced during a relatively
short time period (T¼3 h) with rapid evolution (G¼3). In the
same graph, the edges starting from another typical energy
provider are modeled with an impact value of 5 experienced
48 h after the failure and with a linear evolution (G¼2). The
model presented in this paper can project the evolution of the
dependency risk paths for all the time periods for all the
models.
Algorithm 1:.3.1.2. Setup
The growth rates computed using Eq. (4) are used to pre-
compute all possible values of I(t) for all possible combina-
tions of I, T and G (see Algorithm 1). The output of Algorithm
1 is used as input to a fuzzy ranking system that provides
realistic assessments of the evolution of potential failures.
The fuzzy logic classiﬁcation system uses the following
membership sets:
 Impact set: This set partitions the [1..9] impact scale as Very
Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High:
fVL¼ f1g;L¼ f2;3g;M¼ f4; 5g;H¼ f6; 7g;VH¼ f8; 9gg.
 Time set: This set partitions the [1..10] time scale as Early,
Medium, Late and Very Late:
fE¼ f1;2;3g;M¼ f4;5;6g;La¼ f7;8g;VLa¼ f9; 10gg.
In order to support the fuzzy mechanism (described
below), the output of Algorithm 1 is stored in the form of
pre-computed tables. The tables provide the expected time-
related impact values for all possible values of G and T. All the
tables are available at http://github.com/geostergiop/CIDA/
wiki.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Im
pa
ct
Time
Slow
Linear
Rapid
Fig. 1 – Expected impact evolution for various growth rates
with I¼9 and T¼4 weeks.
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Ii;jðtÞ for a rapidly-evolving failure (G¼3) that experiences the
worst-case impact at time T¼12 h. The worst-case impact
value of each column is assigned to cells in the row (T¼12 h)
and, obviously, to all rows below this row because the worst-
case impact has already been realized. The time-based
impact values for all the rows above the row (T¼15 min up
to T¼3 h) are calculated by applying an inverse growth rate
on the cell values in the T¼12 h row using Eq. (4) for G¼3.
Note that the impact and time values are grouped accord-
ing to the fuzzy impact and time membership sets, respec-
tively. For example, in Table 2, the fuzzy impact membership
set Low contains impact values from 1 up to 3. All the values
were obtained by applying the rapid (logarithmic) growth
scale and time T¼12 h as the expected time of occurrence of
the worst-case impact value.
The output of the algorithm is computed during setup and
stored in 30 tables. Speciﬁcally, for each of the three growth
rates G, it is necessary to pre-compute and store one table for
each of the ten possible T values.
3.1.3. Calculating fuzzy time-based impact values
The pre-computed tables containing all the expected time-
based impact values I(t) enable the fuzzy estimation of the
time-related impact values for a dependency risk graph. For
each dependency, the growth rate G and the expected time T
of the worst-case impact value I are used to select the
corresponding table from the database. Next, the fuzzy sets
corresponding to the impact labels (Very Low, Low, Medium,
High, Very High) are generated using the corresponding
columns in the selected table. These fuzzy sets and linguistic
IF–THEN rules are used to calculate the fuzzy value of the
expected time-based impact value. The linguistic rules are
expressed as: IF variable is property THEN action. All the IF–
THEN rules are invoked using the constructed membership
sets as linguistic variables to determine the fuzzy time-based
impact value, which is given by:
FuzzyðI;G;T; tÞ ¼ IðtÞ ð5Þ
I ðtÞ is computed as follows. The initial processing stage
invokes the appropriate IF–THEN rules and generates a result
for each rule. The results are then combined to output a set of
truth values. Each IF–THEN result is, essentially, a member-
ship function and truth value that control the output set (i.e.,the linguistic variables impact and time). The ﬁnal step in
obtaining a single quantitative value from a fuzzy set is
known as “defuzziﬁcation.”
In the defuzziﬁcation process, all the IF–THEN output
results are combined to yield a single fuzzy time-based
impact value for each time point in the time scale. The
rightmost membership defuzziﬁcation technique [50], which
outputs the rightmost (i.e., highest) impact value, is
employed. This is consistent with risk-based standards that
tend to favor worst-case scenarios.
The output fuzzy time-base impact values IðtÞ are con-
sidered to be more objective approximations of the expected
impact at a given time because, instead of simply using the
appropriate pre-computed expected time-based impact I(t),
the fuzzy values also consider their neighboring values. Thus
the fuzzy values tend to better approximate real-world
situations. In short, each dependency has its own expected
growth, but it is also affected by the growth of its nearby
dependencies.
As an example, suppose a dependency has input data G¼3
and T¼12 h. Thus, the fuzzy mechanism selects Table 2. The
label Low of the fuzzy impact set (columns 3 and 4) contains
only values 1, 2, 3. Using the aforementioned mechanism, the
fuzzy membership set Low is deﬁned as {(1, 0.05) (2, 0.55) (3,
0.4)}, where the second value of each tuple is the membership
value of the corresponding impact value. The following
subset of rules is used to calculate the Low output set of
the value I ðtÞ:
Rule 17: IF Impact is Low AND Time is Early THEN
Fuzzy_Impact is Very Low
Rule 18: IF Impact is Low AND Time is Medium THEN
Fuzzy_Impact is Medium
Rule 19: IF Impact is Low AND Time is Late THEN
Fuzzy_Impact is High
Rule 20: IF Impact is Low AND Time is Very Late THEN
Fuzzy_Impact is High
Next, the fuzzy impact for I¼2 is computed. The fuzzy set
that is most characterized by this value is Low. Assume that
the worst-case scenario is at T¼12 h. Based on Table 2, this
time value belongs to the Medium time fuzzy set. Thus, using
Rule 18, a Medium fuzzy time-based impact value is pro-
duced. Finally, the rightmost membership defuzziﬁcation
technique is used on all the fuzzy sets to obtain the discrete
time-based impact value.
3.1.4. Time-related multi-order dependency risk
The static model described in Section 2.1 can now be
extended to provide multiple estimates of the evolution of
the dependency risk. This is accomplished by replacing the
static impact values Ii;j with the dynamic fuzzy time-related
impact values I i;jðtÞ described above. These values are used to
extend Eqs (2) and (3) and compute the nth-order dependency
RY0 ;…;Yn and cumulative risk DRY0 ;…;Yn of a risk graph for each
point on the time scale as follows:
DRY0 ;…;Yn ðtÞ ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1
RY0 ;…;Yi 
Xn
i ¼ 1
∏
i
j ¼ 1
LYj 1 ;Yj
 !
 IYi 1 ;Yi ðtÞ ð6Þ
or, if the likelihood assessments are omitted:
Table 2 – Pre-computed table with the expected time-related impact values for rapidly-evolving failures (G¼3) with the
worst impact at T¼12 hours.
Time Related Impact Very Low (1) Low (2) Low(3) Medium (4) Medium (5) High (6) High (7) Very High (8) Very High (9)
Early 15 minutes 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4
1 hour 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 6
3 hours 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 6 7
Medium 12 hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
24 hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
48 hours 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Late 1 week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 weeks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very Late 4 weeks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4 4 weeks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Xn
i ¼ 1
RY0 ;…;Yi 
Xn
i ¼ 1
IYi 1 ;Yi ðtÞ ð7Þ
Eqs. (6) and (7) produce ten different values, one for each
examined value of t.
3.2. Combining cascading and common-cause failure risks
The dependency risk values computed by Eqs. (6) or (7)
assume a single initiating event (disruption) at a single
critical infrastructure that results in cascading disruptions.
It does not cover common-cause failures that simultaneously
affect several, seemingly independent critical infrastructures.
Such events can cause multiple cascading chains where the
impact is introduced to multiple nodes in the graph simulta-
neously. Thus, the model must be extended to also capture
failures that are simultaneously cascading and common-
cause failures. A variety of incidents can serve as initiating
events, including accidents, natural disasters and human-
initiated attacks. For example, a common-cause initiating
event may concurrently affect critical infrastructures (not
identiﬁed as being directly dependent on each other) due to
their physical proximity. Examples include a ﬂood or national
strike.
Let Le be the likelihood of an event (threat) e. In the case of
a natural disaster, the value of Le can be assessed based on
statistics of previous incidents, prognostics and the presence
of vulnerabilities. However, the likelihood of an adversarial
attack is more complex; in this case, the likelihood is affected
by the motivation and skills of the adversary as well as his
perceived impact of the attack. For this reason, expert
opinions are commonly elicited and a worst-case approach
is used to obtain the maximum valuation of risk.
Eq. (6) (or its simpliﬁed impact-only version, Eq. (7)) is used
to evaluate all possible nth-order dependency risks. Let CI be
the set of all the examined critical infrastructures. The
combined common-cause risk CRðCIY0 ; eÞ of all possible chains
of cascading events CIY0-CIY1-CIYn initiated by a common-
cause failure event e for each possible source infrastructure
CIY0ACI can be computed as the sum of all possible risk
chains DRY0 ;…;Yn 8Y0ACI multiplied by the likelihood Le of
each examined event e:
CRðCI; eÞ ¼ Le 
X
8Y0ACI
DRY0 ;…;Yn ðtÞ ð8ÞEvery critical infrastructure (node) that is affected by a
common-cause event e is examined as a possible root of a
dependency chain (as CIY0 ). For each CIY0 , the cumulative
dependency risk DR is computed by applying Eq. (6) or its
simpliﬁed version, Eq. (7).4. CIDA tool
This section describes the design and implementation of the
Critical Infrastructure Dependency Analysis (CIDA) tool [42],
which implements the dependency analysis methodology
described in this paper.
4.1. Neo4J graph database
A graph database model was selected as the main building
block of CIDA. Graph databases are storage systems that
provide index-free adjacency. Graph databases model data
more effectively than relational databases, especially when
the relationships between elements are the driving force for
data model design [40,52]. In a graph database, every node
only needs to know the nodes to which it is connected (i.e., its
edges). This enables a graph database system to leverage
graph theory to efﬁciently examine the connections and
degrees of node connectivity. In addition, an edge utility
enables a graph database to ﬁnd results in associative data
sets. Graph databases scale naturally to large data sets and to
data sets with frequently-changing or on-the-ﬂy schema [52].
The Neo4J [28] framework was selected to implement CIDA
due to its adaptability, scalability and efﬁciency. According to
recent empirical studies [2,16,40], Neo4J outperforms other
systems in load time for thousands of elements as well as in
the time required to compute the total paths and detect the
shortest path. On the other hand, Neo4J has inferior perfor-
mance for highly volatile network topologies (e.g., graphs
with frequent changes in nodes and edges) compared with
other graph model approaches (e.g., DEX and Titan-Cassan-
dra). This deﬁciency is not relevant to this work because
critical infrastructure dependencies do not change
frequently.
Neo4J builds on the property graph model: nodes may have
labels and each label can serve as an informational entity. The
nodes are connected via directed, typed relationships. Both
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value pairs). Although there is no rigid schema, the node labels
and relationship types can provide to the nodes as much
meta-information as necessary for the node attributes
required by a speciﬁc schema. When importing data into a
graph database, the relationships are treated with equal
importance as the database records themselves [52].
Neo4j deploys a single server instance that can handle a
graph of billions of nodes and relationships. If the data
throughput exceeds a limit imposed by the computing
resources, the graph database can be distributed among
multiple servers to provide a scalable conﬁguration with high
availability. In addition, Neo4J listeners can capture useful
signals (notices) that objects broadcast in response to certain
events (e.g., changes to property values or user interactions).
As explained later, these two graph functions are the most
important factors that affect the computational time for
analyzing dependent and interconnected critical infrastruc-
tures. During development, the Blueprints technology was
also used; this provides a property graph model interface that
supports a Neo4J graph database.
4.2. Dependency graph analysis
The CIDA graph-based critical infrastructure dependency
analysis tool implements the methodology presented in this
paper in order to dynamically analyze the risk of critical
infrastructure dependency chains under cascading and/or
common-cause failures. CIDA computes the security risk
and/or impact evolution of dependencies over time. CIDA
represents complex graphs of thousands of dependent criti-
cal infrastructures as a weighted, directed graph. The weight
of each connection (edge) between two critical infrastructures
is the (maximum) estimated dependency risk value derived
from the dependency between the two infrastructures. To
render the computation of the risk dependency paths more
efﬁcient, a maximum depth limit on the examined depen-
dencies is set. Empirical research [49] has revealed that
cascading effects rarely affect critical infrastructures beyond
ﬁfth-order dependencies. Thus, the ﬁfth-order is used as the
upper limit on the critical infrastructure dependencies that
are evaluated.
CIDA takes as input the nodes and edges of a graph (either
from a spreadsheet or via the graphical interface). For each
edge CIi-CIj, the estimated likelihood Lij and the (maximum)
expected impact Iij are used to conduct a static analysis. For a
dynamic time-based analysis, the expected time Tij of the
maximum impact and the expected growth rate Gij for the
dependency are also required.
Given an input dependency graph, CIDA yields the follow-
ing outputs:
 A table of all existing dependency paths up to a maximum
dependency order (ﬁfth-order by default).
 In a static analysis (based only on Lij and Iij), for each
dependency path, the cumulative dependency risk is
computed using Eq. (2).
 In a dynamic analysis (additionally, using the time-related
inputs Tij and Gij), the expected cumulative dependency
risk is computed for various time frames using Eq. (6). The dependency paths may be sorted based on their
cumulative dependency risk values and can also be pre-
sented in a graphical form. If the user has set a maximum
risk threshold, CIDA also highlights all the paths that have
values greater than the risk threshold. The paths can be
exported to a spreadsheet or an XML ﬁle for further
analysis.
 CIDA graphically highlights the path that exhibits the
maximum cumulative dependency risk using a modiﬁed
version of Dijkstra's algorithm, which uses negative weights
(risk values) to compute the maximum weighted path.
Based on the user's preferences, CIDA can compute cyclic
paths (if feedback effects are considered) as well as acyclic
paths (if feedback effects are excluded). In cases where the
likelihood values are not available, CIDA can proceed using
only the impact values and Eqs. (3) and (7) can be used for
static and dynamic analyses of dependency impact paths,
respectively. Obviously, impact estimates will be higher than
risk estimates; this is because they represent worst-case
scenarios that assume if a node fails, then all the following
nodes will experience total failure.
4.3. Modeling infrastructures and dependencies
In CIDA, each node may represent a critical infrastructure or
an “autonomous” sub-component of a critical infrastructure
(e.g., a power generation substation) depending on the
desired level of analysis. Each node in a graph supports the
following attributes:
 Name: A unique name for the critical infrastructure node.
 Critical infrastructure operator: The critical infrastructure
operator responsible for the node. If the analysis is per-
formed at the unit level, then one operator may be
responsible for several nodes.
 Critical infrastructure sector: The speciﬁc critical infrastruc-
ture sector to which the node belongs (e.g., information
and communications technology).
 Critical infrastructure sub-sector: The speciﬁc sub-sector to
which the node belongs (e.g., telecommunications).
 Node location: The latitude and longitude of the location.
This captures geographical dependencies between critical
infrastructures and helps evaluate potential threats that
concurrently affect multiple nodes.
 MaxPath: A Boolean value that indicates if the node belongs
to the maximum risk path.
CIDA supports seventeen critical infrastructure sectors,
including information and communications, energy, trans-
portation, water systems and the critical infrastructure sec-
tors identiﬁed in [6,46]. CIDA also supports the modeling of all
types of dependencies. While logical, informational and
physical dependencies may be deﬁned in service level agree-
ments and are, thus, easier to identify, geographical depen-
dencies may be missed. CIDA can automatically identify
geographical dependencies based on the locations provided
for the critical infrastructure nodes. This enables CIDA to
study threat scenarios within a speciﬁc geographical region
and, thus, to assess the effects of geographical dependencies.
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path using the appropriate equations described above. The
risk values are then associated with the weighted, directed
graph stored in the Neo4J database. CIDA provides a visuali-
zation interface using the JUNG2 graph visualization library
that is supported by Blueprints and Neo4J.
Fig. 2 shows an example dependency risk graph output.
Each node represents a critical infrastructure and the weight
of each edge is the estimated dependency risk value that
derives from the dependency between two critical infrastruc-
tures. The type of the dependency is also depicted. Dark grey
edges and nodes indicate the maximum cascading risk path.
The complete set of paths and the relative risk values may be
exported to a spreadsheet for further analysis.5. Efﬁciency analysis
This section empirically analyzes the efﬁciency of the CIDA
dependency analysis tool using granular random scenarios
containing from 10 to 1000 critical infrastructure nodes as
test cases. All the tests were performed using a workstation
with an Intel Core i-7 2.7 GHz processor with four cores and
16 GB RAM. For each scenario, two cases with different
degrees of connectivity were examined. In the low connec-
tivity case, each node was randomly connected to at least one
and at most three other nodes. In the high connectivity case,
each node was randomly connected to at least four nodes
and at most ﬁve other nodes. For each case, the execution
time was multiplied by a factor of ten to estimate the
execution time for dynamic analysis. This is because, in the
case of time-based analysis, all the computations are
repeated for each examined time frame.
In real-world scenarios the majority of nodes would have
connectivity degrees no greater than three and only a small
fraction of nodes would have high degrees of connectivity of
four or ﬁve (e.g., major electrical substations and key tele-
communications nodes) [49]. Thus, it is reasonable to expect
that, in a real-world scenario, the average connectivity degree
of nodes is between these values and the expected execution
time is between the two execution times (for the same
number of nodes).
Each test was repeated ten times and the mean execution
time was computed. The execution time included the time for
computing all dependency risk paths up to ﬁfth-order depen-
dencies and the time required to sort the paths based on their
execution times and compute the maximum dependency risk
path. Again, since cascading effects rarely affect nodes more
than four hops away from the source, the computation of up
to ﬁfth-order dependencies was adequate to cover the major-
ity of the cases [49]. As expected, the computational time of
the complete set of dependency risk paths increases expo-
nentially with the number of nodes (Fig. 3). Also, the con-
nectivity degree appears to affect the execution time
signiﬁcantly. For example, the 1000 node scenario required
about 20 min for nodes with low connectivity (one to three
edges per node) and more than 332 min for high connectivity
nodes (four to ﬁve edges per node).
Since the maximum path problem is NP-complete, it is
obvious that CIDA cannot provide a complete theoreticalsolution. However, with reasonable limitations in system
parameters such as the maximum number of nodes, degree
of node connectivity and degree of dependency order, CIDA
can efﬁciently provide useful results for large-scale and cross-
sectoral real-world scenarios.6. Analyzing real-world scenarios with
cascading effects
This section evaluates scenarios based on a real-world case
involving cascading effects to demonstrate the applicability
of CIDA. Although the tests are based on a real case, the
impact, likelihood and time-related inputs assigned to each
dependency are not based on real risk assessment results.
Such assessment results are not publicly available, so the
tests rely on subjective assumptions for demonstration
purposes.
6.1. Real-world cascading blackout
This scenario, which comprises nine nodes, is based on the
well-known electricity blackout in California [33]. The sce-
nario was selected because it is well-documented and exhi-
bits several complex cross-sectoral and multi-order cascading
dependencies. The initiating event in the scenario was the
failure of an electric power substation (node A in Fig. 4). The
event triggered several ﬁrst-order dependencies: disruption of
a natural gas production infrastructure (node B), disruption of
petroleum pipelines (node E) that transported jet fuel to
neighboring states and disruptions of massive water pump
units (node H).
As shown in Fig. 4, the disruption of gas production (node
B) directly impacted gas supplies for steam injection units
(node C), a second-order dependency. The steam injection
units affected the operation of heavy oil recovery units (node
D), a third-order dependency, further exacerbating power
problems at node A (feedback loop). Similarly, the disruption
of petroleum pipelines (node E) caused inventories to build up
at reﬁneries and draw down at product terminals, including
at several major California airports (node F), a second-order
dependency. The reduction of jet fuel stocks at the airports
caused several major airline operators (node G) to consider
contingency plans, a third-order dependency. Finally, the
disruption of water pump units (node H) affected crop
irrigation at several ﬁelds (node I), a third-order dependency.
Table 3 presents the input values used in the scenario. For
each dependency, a likelihood and maximum expected
impact estimate are provided. Also, the expected time taken
for the maximum impact to be manifested is provided, along
with an estimate of the growth rate of the failure.
Note that the input data for ﬁrst-order dependencies can
be fed to CIDA via a spreadsheet (Table 3) or via a graphical
interface (Fig. 5). Given the input data, CIDA computes the
complete set of dependency risk paths in a time frame for
each dependency chain of order no greater than ﬁve using Eq.
(6).
CIDA outputs a graphical representation of the examined
dependency risk graph (Fig. 6). In this case, the graph of the
nine examined nodes produces 38 chains with orders ranging
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1.5 and 13.17. The nodes and edges marked with darker
colors are associated with the maximum cumulative depen-
dency risk path.
6.2. Cascading-only dependency failure scenario
After CIDA has evaluated all the dependency risk paths, it is
possible for a user to examine several scenarios in an efﬁcient
manner. One scenario is to analyze and compare all possible
cascading effects. CIDA produces a list of all the dependency
paths sorted according to their cumulative dependency risk
values. This helps the user to identify all the potential
dependency risks that are above a speciﬁed threshold value.
For example, Fig. 7 shows the subset of dependency risk
paths that exhibit cumulative risk values above a threshold of
ﬁve, regardless of the time taken to reach the threshold. It
also shows the risk values of the maximum risk paths for all
the examined time periods as well as the maximum risk
levels for the remaining paths at the time of occurrence. Note
that the user may project different paths using different
thresholds.
The threshold parameter assists users in determining the
most effective risk mitigation strategies. In Fig. 7, it is easy to
see that the four dependency paths with the highest risk
values surpass the threshold within one hour after the initial
failure and they all start at node A. Thus, a cost-effective
strategy would start by applying mitigation controls at node
A with a rapid response time; this would decrease the overall
dependency risk substantially. If mitigation controls at node
A are too expensive, an alternative strategy is to reduce the
likelihood of cascades to the most important second-order
dependencies of node A (nodes B and E).
A second result of the analysis is that, although path A–B–C–D
exhibits the highest risk for almost all the examined time
frames, the graph reveals that path A–E–F–G is the most criticalFig. 2 – Dependency risk graph for a test scenario with
100 nodes.path about 12 h after a cascading failure. This is because,
although dependencies A–B and A–E both have rapid growth,
the second dependency is expected to have the fastest conver-
gence to its maximum impact (TAE ¼ 12 h). Recall that this
methodology supports different Tij and Gij values for each
dependency.
A third result can be obtained by comparing the evolution
of sub-paths that exhibit high risk. For example, although the
path A–B–C–D is the highest risk path, its sub-path A–B–C
already exhibits an impact greater than the threshold within
1 h. Thus, it is necessary to implement mitigation controls at
the ﬁrst- or second-order dependency.
Finally, for the remaining dependency paths A–H–I, B–C–
D–A–E–F and C–D–A–E–F–G, it is safe to consider mitigation
controls with slower response times because they have
relatively low risk values even for long time frames. Note
that the last two paths include the chain A–E–F as a sub-path,
so mitigation controls implemented at A–E–F concurrently
reduce the risk of four of the seven most critical paths.
6.3. Combined common-cause and cascading scenarios
Another scenario is to analyze all the cascading effects that
may potentially be triggered by a common-cause failure. In
this case, for each examined node, CIDA computes the sum of
the dependency risks of all the existing distinct paths
originating from the node (to avoid repetitions of the same
risk chain, only distinct paths are considered). In the exam-
ined case, node A (as expected) is by far the most critical node
for common-cause failures – the sum of distinct risk paths is
33.22 (paths A–B–C–D, A–E–F–G and A–H–I). In a common-
cause scenario, at least two nodes are directly affected by the
initiating event, which serves as the common cause of the
failures. Therefore, for each affected node, it is necessary to
calculate the sum of distinct risk paths and weight these
values with the likelihood value Le of the initiating event e
(failure or attack) that may be realized at the source nodes.
The combined risk for every possible initiating event e at each
directly affected node is computed using Eq. (8).
Note that the complete set of dependency chain risks is
already an output of the CIDA tool. Thus, the evaluation of
the possible common-cause failures is based on “ready-to-
use” risk chains. The user may add initiating events and
likelihood values to every node according to the probability
that the examined event causes a failure to the node. The
initiating events e and likelihood values Le are selected by the
user based on expert opinion and statistical data. Obviously,
it is reasonable to ﬁrst examine nodes that exhibit higher
sums of risk values before they are weighted with Le.7. Comparison with other approaches
Ouyang [30] distinguishes modeling and simulation
approaches as: (i) empirical; (ii) agent based; (ii) system
dynamics based; (iv) economic theory based; (v) network
(topology or ﬂow) based; and (vi) others (hierarchical holo-
graphic modeling based, high level architecture based, Petri
net based, dynamic control system theory based, Bayesian
network based, etc.). Another taxonomy of dependency
10 50 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 1000
1-3 edges/node (static) 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.51 1.03 2.00 3.55 5.82 9.00 20.14
4-5 edges/node (static) 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.79 4.06 10.04 22.28 45.89 84.86 143.43 332.11
1-3 edges/node (dynamic) 0.26 0.43 0.53 1.58 5.12 10.33 19.98 35.47 58.20 89.98 201.40
4-5 edges/node (dynamic) 0.34 0.67 1.85 7.88 40.58 100.41 222.76 458.92 848.58 1434.33 3321.11
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Fig. 3 – Execution time versus number of nodes.
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Fig. 4 – Dependencies in the California blackout scenario.
Table 3 – Input values for the blackout scenario.
CIi CIj Li;j Ii;j Ti;j Gi;j
A B 0.90 8 24 h Rapid
B C 0.65 6 48 h Linear
C D 0.70 6 48 h Slow
D A 0.15 3 2 w Slow
A H 0.80 6 12 h Rapid
H I 0.65 7 48 h Linear
A E 0.90 8 12 h Rapid
E F 0.70 5 24 h Slow
F G 0.25 8 1 w Slow
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and demand tools; (ii) dynamic simulations; (iii) agent based
models; (iv) physics based models; (v) population mobility
models; and (vi) Leontief input–output models. The metho-
dology presented in this paper can be categorized as hybrid
because it has characteristics of empirical methods (as a risk
based approach) and network based methods (as a graph
modeling tool).
Empirical methods have been criticized by researchers due
to the lack of statistical data required to assess the likelihood
of potential events. While probability data may be difﬁcult to
collect for many critical infrastructures, efforts have already
been made to do so in speciﬁc critical infrastructure sectors.
For example, Carreras et al. [5] have conducted statistical
studies of blackouts that enable the identiﬁcation of critical
power lines or groups of power lines for a given network
model. This helps identify critical clusters of lines that are
likely to trigger or propagate cascading effects due to power
line vulnerabilities.
The approach presented in this paper also draws from
network based methods in that it combines a method for
discovering dependency risk paths with an automated mod-
eling and analysis tool. It enables the dependencies of the
connected infrastructures to be depicted as a graph and
critical paths to be identiﬁed. Such ﬂow based network
approaches are described in the literature. They either model
the ﬂow of products or services between critical infrastruc-
tures in a uniform model [25,43,44] or they combine various
sector-based ﬂow models [31,36].
Most modeling, simulation and analysis tools in the
literature are sector-speciﬁc. For example, in the water sector,
OpenMI [45] supports federated modeling and simulation for
a wide range of technical, organizational and economic
aspects related to water systems (e.g., sea, dikes,groundwater, water management and more). Other
approaches allow for integrated or federated simulations that
combine models from multiple sectors; examples include
DIESIS [35,47], EPIC [41] and I2Sim [27].
With regard to the level of analysis, CIDA does not model
infrastructures at the component level. For this reason, CIDA
has similarities with the empirical Leontief input–output
models used for high-level multi-sectoral risk assessments
[15,37–39]. These approaches measure the dependencies
existing between critical infrastructure sectors in terms of
economic relationships. The approach of Setola et al. [39]
considers domain expert opinion and uses fuzzy logic to
assess the impact induced by direct and higher-order depen-
dencies between critical infrastructures. The approach
assumes that critical infrastructure operators (or the experts
who conduct assessments) provide input data about the
impact values for resource outages of various durations in
each critical infrastructure. Like CIDA, the approach of Setola
et al. [39] uses fuzzy logic. The approach of Setola et al. [39]
uses it to minimize the uncertainty and ambiguity associated
with subjective information received from domain experts.
On the other hand, CIDA combines fuzzy logic with various
time growth models. Each dependency may follow a different
growth rate and fuzzy logic is used to objectify the evolution
of each dependency, taking into consideration the states of
other nearby dependencies. This enables CIDA to output
results for various time frames (also available in [39]) as well
as for alternative failure growth rates. Moreover, CIDA uses a
dependency risk graph to model a variety of dependencies,
not just economic dependencies.
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ability model to assess the dependencies between various
sectors of an economy and to forecast the effects of a disruption
in one sector on another sector. However, the approach
presented in this paper is not a purely economical one.
Another important difference is that CIDA allows altera-
tive graphs to be created to analyze dependencies that occur
in abnormal operating conditions; in contrast, the inputs to
the approaches described in [15,37,38] only incorporate
dependencies in normal economic operations. Additionally,
CIDA can perform a time-based analysis, which offers differ-
ent risk results according to the time frame studied and the
rate at which the impact evolves in each criticalFig. 5 – Graphical interface for inputing node and edge data.
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Fig. 6 – Dependency risk grapinfrastructure. With regard to the input data required for
analysis, the approaches use aggregated economic data on a
sector basis, while CIDA uses risk assessment data provided
by owners and operators for each infrastructure.
Another economic-based approach is implemented in
N-ABLE, a NISAC tool [11]. N-ABLE is a large-scale micro-
economic simulation tool that models complex supply
chains, spatial market dynamics and critical infrastructure
interdependencies between U.S. businesses. N-ABLE is to
model how U.S. businesses adapt to and recover from
disruptive events. CIDA, on the other hand, is not speciﬁ-
cally engineered to model the economic impact at the
microeconomic level.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection/Decision Support
System (CIP/DSS) [4,7] enables decision makers to determine
the consequences of infrastructure disruptions. CIP/DSS
assesses uncertainties with regard to threats, vulnerabilities
and consequences of terrorist acts and natural disasters at
the metropolitan and national scales. It models interdepen-
dencies for all U.S. critical infrastructures and key resources
and calculates the impacts that cascade into these interde-
pendent infrastructures and into the national economy. The
CIDA tool can beneﬁt from the CIP/DSS representation of
mitigation alternatives in order to enhance the selection of
mitigation strategies.
Experiments reveal that CIDA can efﬁciently compute the
risks of all the dependency risk paths when reasonable limits
are placed on the order of dependencies. However, the
execution times for large-scale scenarios comprising hun-
dreds of nodes may not be feasible for real-time analysis and
response. CIPR/Sim [53] is an effective real-time analysis tool
that imports real-time data from numerous analysis mod-
ules, including a real-time digital simulator for electric grid
analysis, QualNet for telecommunications analysis and PC
Tide for wind speed and ﬂood surge analysis.k = 3.6
PHYSICAL | Risk = 1.8
Crop Fields | I
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h of the blackout scenario.
Fig. 7 – Dependency risk paths with cumulative dependency risk greater than a threshold of ﬁve.
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The CIDA modeling and analysis tool supports the proactive
study of large-scale dependency scenarios. In particular, the
tool helps risk assessors and critical infrastructure protection
decision makers to assess dependency risks before an initiat-
ing threat is realized. By analyzing the complete set of
potential dependency paths, a user can project all the
cascading effects that may be realized and ﬂag dependency
risks that are above a threshold for further attention.
CIDA can also be used to run speciﬁc scenarios of interest
to risk assessors. While the computation of the complete set
of dependency risk paths may provide useful information
and reveal “hidden” dependency risks, assessors may also
use CIDA to examine speciﬁc realistic scenarios. These
include “what-if” scenarios that only consider initiating
security events that affect one (or some) critical infrastruc-
ture nodes. Such a scenario may involve a major physical
disaster that initially affects all the nodes in a geographical
area. This is easily implemented because the attributes of
each node in CIDA can incorporate geographical coordinates.
Thus, it is possible to assess scenarios involving common-
cause failures to targeted nodes and examine the cascading
effects based on geographical dependencies.
The proactive assessment of risk mitigation controls helps
increase resilience. Based on real input data, it is feasible to
examine hundreds of scenarios, including previous incidents.
Risk assessors may efﬁciently employ slight variations of
dependency graphs with different weights and even different
dependencies to simulate the implementation of alternativerisk mitigation controls. For example, if a particular path has
been identiﬁed by exhaustive computations as a dependency
risk path above the maximum risk threshold, CIDA can be
used to project the effect of implementing redundant security
controls to decrease the impact of a dependency. Alterna-
tively, it can be used to reduce or eliminate dependencies
using security controls in order to optimize the topology of
interdependent critical infrastructures. Both examples
increase the absorbing capacity of individual critical infra-
structure nodes or a network of critical infrastructures to
enhance the overall resilience.
The CIDA tool can also be used to identify and target key
nodes in order to make them more resistant to failures or to
improve their restorative capabilities. In this way, it is
possible to evaluate the beneﬁts of various alternative and/
or complementary mitigation controls, and provide convin-
cing arguments about the expected beneﬁts of mitigation
strategies. Note that studies of such scenarios can be paral-
lelized using additional computing resources.
A limitation of the methodology presented in this paper is
its reliance on prior risk assessments of critical infrastruc-
tures. This is inherent to all the empirical risk approaches –
empirical risk-based approaches analyze dependencies based
on previous incidents (historical incident or disaster data)
coupled with expert opinion to identify alternative measures
that minimize the dependency risk (see, e.g., [13,18,48]). It is
highly unlikely for a single critical infrastructure owner or
operator to have access to real data about other critical
infrastructures. Thus, the methodology can only be applied
at a higher layer. For example, sector coordinators or regula-
tors may collect data about a speciﬁc sector such as energy or
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f c r i t i c a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o t e c t i o n 1 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 4 6 – 6 0 59information and communications technology. National criti-
cal infrastructure protection authorities may also be able to
collect such information. This data can be gradually incorpo-
rated in the CIDA database to support the analysis of large-
scale scenarios. Moreover, the CIDA tool can be used with the
expected impacts of dependent critical infrastructures while
ignoring likelihood parameters that are generally more difﬁ-
cult to collect [13]. Details of the entire CIDA Project, including
the stress test implementation and the tool itself, are avail-
able at http://github.com/geostergiop/CIDA.
Future work will focus on enhancing CIDA with statistical
data pertaining to potential initiating events and their like-
lihoods of occurrence for key sectors such as energy and
information and communications technology. This will
further assist risk assessors in evaluating combined
common-case and cascading failures.Acknowledgements
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